Démarchage téléphonique chez Swisscom : Anatomie d’une pratique commerciale indigne

Nov 182025

Comment l’opérateur historique suisse exploite la confiance de ses clients pour leur vendre des contrats majorés de près de 100%

Le piège

En mai 2025, je reçois un appel téléphonique. L’identifiant affiche le numéro du service clientèle Swisscom — rien qui puisse éveiller la méfiance d’un client de longue date. Mon interlocuteur, volubile et pressant, me propose de transférer mes abonnements de téléphonie mobile vers Swisscom. Il m’assure que les tarifs seront équivalents à ceux de mon fournisseur précédent : CHF 48.00 par mois.

Je donne mon accord verbal — ce qui, en droit suisse, suffit à former un contrat.

Le représentant promet d’envoyer les confirmations écrites. Elles n’arrivent jamais. Le 31 juillet, les lignes sont activées sans que j’aie reçu le moindre document contractuel.

Trois jours plus tard, la première facture tombe : CHF 89.90.

Soit une majoration de 87 %.

L’aveu par omission

Je contacte immédiatement Swisscom pour exiger les enregistrements de la conversation téléphonique — seule preuve objective de ce qui fut convenu. La réponse de M. Yari Bianchi, « Customer Consultant Complaint », mérite d’être citée dans son intégralité cynique :

« Au sujet des appels téléphoniques, il n’est plus possible de récupérer les enregistrements après 40 jours et ceux-ci sont effectués uniquement à des fins de formations. »

Qu’il me soit permis de m’émerveiller devant cette politique d’une élégance remarquable : les enregistrements existent suffisamment longtemps pour « former » les employés, mais sont détruits avant que le client ne puisse s’en prévaloir pour contester une facturation abusive. Quelle heureuse coïncidence que les délais d’activation et de facturation dépassent précisément cette fenêtre de quarante jours.

Swisscom prétend ensuite m’avoir envoyé des confirmations de commande le 16 mai. Je ne les ai jamais reçues. Face à cette affirmation, je demande la preuve de réception effective. Silence.

L’arrogance institutionnelle

Ma contestation juridique se heurte à un mur. J’invoque le dol (art. 28 CO), le vice du consentement (art. 23 ss CO), la charge de la preuve (art. 8 CC). La réponse de Swisscom, datée du 7 octobre, tient en une phrase d’une morgue sidérante :

« Nous ne répondrons plus à vos demandes concernant cette affaire. »

Voilà donc comment l’opérateur historique suisse traite ses clients : par le mépris. On m’informe que la « procédure d’encaissement suivra son cours » si je ne m’acquitte pas des CHF 3’506.10 réclamés. Pour mémoire, cela représente davantage que la valeur résiduelle des contrats eux-mêmes sur leur durée minimale de 24 mois.

Le dénouement

Ne pouvant obtenir satisfaction par les voies normales, je saisis l’Organe de conciliation des télécommunications (Ombudscom).

Le résultat est instructif. Dans sa prise de position, Swisscom admet soudainement être « dans l’incapacité de retrouver l’enregistrement de la conversation » et « ne pas être en mesure de corroborer l’offre qui aurait été formulée oralement ».

Curieux retournement. Pendant des semaines, l’entreprise a maintenu ses frais avec une assurance absolue, refusant tout dialogue. Il aura fallu l’intervention d’un médiateur pour qu’elle reconnaisse enfin qu’elle ne disposait d’aucune preuve à l’appui de ses prétentions.

Swisscom accepte finalement de supprimer intégralement les frais de résiliation anticipée — CHF 3’398.21.

Le système

Mon cas n’est pas isolé. Parmi mes connaissances, plusieurs personnes âgées ont subi des mésaventures similaires : démarchage téléphonique agressif, promesses verbales non tenues, absence de documentation contractuelle, puis facturation de services à des tarifs sans rapport avec l’offre initiale.

Le schéma est toujours le même. Un appel provenant d’un numéro Swisscom officiel. Un représentant insistant qui promet des conditions avantageuses. Des confirmations écrites qui n’arrivent jamais — ou arrivent si tard que le client ne peut plus exercer son droit de rétractation en connaissance de cause. Puis l’activation, la facture majorée, et l’impossibilité de prouver quoi que ce soit puisque les enregistrements ont été détruits.

Il faudrait que Swisscom m’explique en vertu de quelle logique commerciale un client accepterait sciemment de payer CHF 89.90 pour un service qu’il obtenait à CHF 48.00. À moins, bien sûr, qu’on ne lui eût dissimulé ce détail.

Une entreprise à la dérive

Cette expérience s’inscrit dans un contexte plus large. Swisscom, dont l’État suisse détient 51 %, accumule depuis trois décennies les débâcles financières, les violations du droit de la concurrence et les scandales de gouvernance. J’ai documenté cette chronique accablante dans un article séparé : 3,3 milliards de francs perdus avec Debitel, implication dans le blanchiment d’argent de la ‘Ndrangheta via Fastweb, amendes de 186 millions pour abus de position dominante, fuite de données de 800’000 clients via un sous-traitant tunisien, pannes répétées des numéros d’urgence.

Les études du WIK démontrent que les consommateurs suisses paient leurs télécommunications plus cher que partout ailleurs en Europe. Swisscom maintient une part de marché de 60 % là où les anciens monopoles européens sont tombés à 40 %. La publication K-Tipp l’a résumé sans détour : « les clients financent les pertes étrangères de Swisscom ».

Ainsi donc, l’entreprise engrange des bénéfices excessifs sur le marché domestique, dilapide des milliards à l’étranger, et complète le tableau en extorquant quelques milliers de francs supplémentaires aux personnes âgées par le biais de pratiques commerciales douteuses.

Conclusion et mise en garde

Il m’aura fallu des semaines de correspondance, la rédaction de multiples courriers juridiques, et finalement l’intervention de l’ombudsman pour obtenir l’annulation de frais que Swisscom savait parfaitement injustifiés — puisqu’elle était incapable d’en administrer la preuve.

Combien de clients, moins au fait du droit des obligations ou simplement découragés par l’arrogance de l’entreprise, paient sans broncher ?

Mon conseil est simple : si vous recevez un appel de démarchage de Swisscom vous proposant des offres « avantageuses », raccrochez immédiatement. N’acceptez jamais d’engagement verbal. Exigez toute proposition par écrit, avec un délai de réflexion. Vérifiez scrupuleusement les conditions avant toute activation.

Et si vous êtes déjà pris au piège, ne cédez pas aux menaces de recouvrement. Contestez par écrit. Invoquez le dol et le vice du consentement. Exigez les enregistrements téléphoniques — vous constaterez qu’ils ont été opportunément détruits. Saisissez l’ombudsman https://fr.ombudscom.ch/procedure-de-conciliation.

Il est inadmissible qu’une entreprise détenue majoritairement par la Confédération se livre à de telles pratiques. Les citoyens suisses méritent mieux que cette exploitation systématique de leur confiance.

Swisscom: A Chronicle of Mismanagement, Scandals, and Squandered Billions

Finance, Technology No Responses »

Nov 182025

Executive Summary

Swisscom, Switzerland’s dominant telecommunications provider with 51% state ownership, presents a troubling pattern of catastrophic foreign investments, criminal entanglements, competition law violations, and questionable governance spanning three decades. Swiss taxpayers, as majority shareholders, have ultimately borne the costs of management failures totalling well over 10 billion francs.

1. The Foreign Investment Disaster Trail

Debitel: 3.3 Billion Francs Down the Drain

In 1999, Swisscom paid 4.3 billion francs to acquire Debitel, Germany’s third-largest mobile services provider, with ambitions to enter the German UMTS market. Five years later, they sold it for approximately 1 billion francs to Permira, crystallising a loss of 3.3 billion francs.

The debacle became politically explosive. The parliamentary Finance Delegation was tasked with investigating, and Nationalrat Pierre Kohler calculated that the Swiss Confederation lost approximately 2 billion francs on this single investment.

Earlier Failures: Hungary, India, Malaysia

Between 1993 and 1997, Swisscom (then Telecom PTT) invested 2 billion francs in ventures across Hungary, India, Malaysia, and Baden-Württemberg (Tesion), plus the pan-European Unisource consortium. The investments proved loss-making, and Swisscom exited in 1999. The bitter irony: companies in Malaysia and India were later sold by their new owners at multiples of what Swisscom received.

Fastweb: From Acquisition to ‘Ndrangheta

In 2007, Swisscom acquired Italian broadband provider Fastweb for 6.9 billion francs. In December 2011, Swisscom was forced to write down 1.3 billion euros due to massive value impairment, described by critics as another “billion-franc grave.”

2. The Mafia Money Laundering Scandal

The Fastweb acquisition embroiled Swisscom in what Italian prosecutors called “one of the most colossal fraud cases in Italian history.”

Between 2003 and 2006, Fastweb and Telecom Italia subsidiary Sparkle were allegedly used to launder approximately 2 billion euros of ‘Ndrangheta mafia money through fictitious international telephone service transactions. The scheme also defrauded the Italian treasury of 360 million euros in VAT.

Swisscom’s Foreknowledge

Swisscom admitted it knew about ongoing tax fraud investigations when it acquired Fastweb in 2007. However, the company claimed it was blindsided by the money laundering dimension. This defence strains credibility given the scale of the operations.

Criminal Proceedings

Fifty-six arrest warrants were issued, including for Fastweb founder Silvio Scaglia (who became a billionaire from selling to Swisscom), former board members, and even an Italian senator from Berlusconi’s party who was photographed embracing an ‘Ndrangheta boss.

Swiss authorities executed house searches in Ticino and Geneva as part of international cooperation.

To prevent the Italian authorities from placing Fastweb under state administration—described by Fastweb’s CEO as “equivalent to murdering the company”—Swisscom CEO Carsten Schloter personally took over as Fastweb chief.

Swisscom had to set aside 70 million euros for potential liabilities.

3. Competition Law Violations and Massive Fines

The 186-Million-Franc ADSL Fine

In 2009, the Competition Commission (Weko) found that Swisscom abused its dominant market position from 2001 to 2007 by charging competitors excessive wholesale prices for ADSL services—creating a “cost-price scissors” that made it impossible for rivals to operate profitably. The initial fine was 220 million francs.

After a decade of legal battles through the Federal Administrative Court and finally the Federal Supreme Court in December 2019, the fine was confirmed at 186 million francs.

The Supreme Court found Swisscom’s behaviour “at minimum negligent” and a clear violation of cartel law. Swisscom’s defence that cable networks provided competitive pressure was rejected.

Following the verdict, Sunrise sued Swisscom for 350 million francs in damages.

The Post Network Abuse

In 2015, Weko fined Swisscom 7.9 million francs for abuse of market dominance in a 2008 tender for connecting Swiss Post locations. Swisscom won the contract by underbidding competitors by 30%, while charging those same competitors wholesale prices that made competitive bids impossible.

Ongoing Antitrust Battles

In 2021, three internet providers (Init7, SolNet, Ticinocom) filed complaints with Weko, alleging Swisscom’s retail prices were so low that competitors buying Swisscom wholesale services couldn’t cover their costs—another “price scissors” allegation.

As early as 2003, Weko had to intervene when Swisscom tried to monopolise the ADSL market through discriminatory volume discounts to its subsidiary Bluewin.

4. The 800,000-Customer Data Breach

The Incident

In autumn 2017, criminals exploited access credentials from a Swisscom sales partner to steal personal data (names, addresses, phone numbers, birthdates) of approximately 800,000 customers.

The data theft actually occurred via a marketing company in Tunisia—a subcontractor of a subcontractor—to which Swisscom’s partner had improperly passed login credentials.

Swisscom’s Response: Suppress and Minimise

Internal documents classified as “secret” reveal Swisscom initially intended to inform neither affected customers nor the public. Three months later, when forced to disclose, Swisscom characterised the stolen data as “not particularly worthy of protection.”

However, Swisscom’s own internal risk assessment, later obtained through freedom-of-information requests, listed eleven serious risks including: darknet trading of customer data, targeted SMS phishing, and “exposure of VIPs or endangered persons” with potential threats to “life and limb.”

Differential Treatment

While ordinary customers had to send an SMS to check if they were affected (and the system gave unreliable results), VIP customers including politicians were proactively notified.

Swisscom fought for two years to prevent release of the risk documents. The Federal Data Protection Commissioner concluded Swisscom “got lucky” that the anticipated harms largely didn’t materialise.

5. Serial Network Failures

2020: A Year of Outages

In 2020 alone, Swisscom suffered at least six major network failures affecting millions of customers. These weren’t minor glitches—emergency numbers 112, 117, 118, and 144 were repeatedly knocked offline across multiple cantons.

In the February 2020 outage, police and rescue services across Basel-Landschaft, Basel, Winterthur, St. Gallen, and other areas had to direct emergency calls through mobile alternatives. Even the government’s Alertswiss app failed.

The pattern was so alarming that the National Council’s Transport and Telecommunications Commission summoned Swisscom management for questioning. Bakom launched formal investigations. The Conference of Cantonal Police Directors declared it “disturbing for the population when emergency calls are impossible.”

Outages continued in 2021 and 2022, with Swisscom offering varying explanations: defective network components, unexpected software behaviour, security system adjustments.

6. Switzerland’s Most Expensive Telecoms

Systemic Overcharging

Studies by the Scientific Institute for Infrastructure and Communication Services (WIK) found Swiss consumers pay more for mobile, fixed-line, and internet than any other country in Europe. Swisscom’s broadband prices run roughly one-third higher than competitors—itself “a European record.”

Consumer publication K-Tipp calculated that “customers finance Swisscom’s foreign losses”—the company makes excess profits domestically, then squanders billions abroad.

While ex-monopolists in EU countries saw their market shares decline to around 40%, Swisscom has maintained roughly 60% across its markets—a dominance WIK attributes to regulatory favour and aggressive marketing that competitors cannot match.

Even as Swisscom raises prices (the “inOne mobile basic” subscription went from 45 to 50 francs in 2020), competitors offer unlimited data for 20-30 francs monthly. Swiss consumers pay approximately 100 francs monthly for combined services—significantly more than in Germany or Austria.

7. The Vodafone Italia Acquisition: History Repeating?

Stealthy Communication

Swisscom announced regulatory approval for its 8-billion-euro Vodafone Italia acquisition on Friday evening, December 20, 2024—when the country was focused on the PUK report on Credit Suisse’s collapse and EU bilateral negotiations. Transaction completion was announced January 2, when the Zurich stock exchange was closed for a holiday.

SVP Nationalrat Franz Grüter called it “almost mischievous”: “They definitely chose the date because they knew it would completely disappear.”

Debt and Downgrade

The acquisition was entirely debt-financed, increasing Swisscom’s net debt by 9.1 billion francs to 15.6 billion francs—almost 2,000 francs per Swiss resident. Moody’s subsequently downgraded Swisscom’s credit rating, noting that debt would exceed government-mandated limits for an extended period.

“Italian Air”

Analysis of Swisscom’s 2024 annual report reveals that over 75% of the 7.4 billion franc purchase price represents goodwill and intangible assets—”Italian air” in the words of financial analysts. Goodwill alone accounts for 1.1 billion francs; licenses 2 billion; and “brand and customer relationships” 1.7 billion.

Political Silence

Remarkably, this acquisition faced virtually no political opposition—unlike the blocked 2005 Eircom bid for just 4.6 billion francs. Critics argue the timing was designed to avoid scrutiny, and the state’s representative on Swisscom’s board approved the deal without public debate.

8. Offshoring Swiss Jobs While Profitable

The Pattern

In September 2025, reports emerged that Swisscom plans to relocate hundreds of IT development jobs from Switzerland to its centres in Riga (Latvia) and Rotterdam (Netherlands), where salaries for senior engineers are 65,000-75,000 francs versus up to 140,000 in Switzerland.

When Swisscom opened these foreign offices in 2019-2020, management explicitly stated they would “not come at the expense of Swiss jobs.” Now the company cites “continuous cost optimisation” for the offshoring.

Union Syndicom reports that employees over 50 particularly fear for their positions. Despite good financial results, Swisscom continues cutting Swiss positions while staff abroad has grown nearly 50% from 2,689 to 3,982 over five years.

Dubious Sales Practices

In May 2025, employees in Swisscom shops in the Vaud-Valais-Fribourg region revealed questionable practices: illegal recording of customer conversations without consent, manipulating contracts to meet sales targets, and selling youth subscriptions to elderly customers who didn’t qualify.

9. Governance Questions

The CEO’s Death

In July 2013, CEO Carsten Schloter was found dead at his home in an apparent suicide at age 49. In one of his last interviews, he described himself as “a victim of modern communication,” finding it “increasingly difficult to unwind.” The death came as Weko opened an investigation into ADSL practices, though his suicide note reportedly cited personal reasons.

State-Owned Hybrid

Critics describe Swisscom as an “unspeakable hybrid”—formally organised under private law but majority state-owned, meaning Swiss taxpayers bear business risks while management operates like a private company seeking profit maximisation.

The Federal Council’s interest in further market liberalisation appears limited given its ownership stake, creating a conflict between its roles as regulator and beneficiary of monopoly profits.

Conclusion: Pattern of Accountability Failure

The record reveals systemic problems:

Repeated billion-franc foreign investment losses (Debitel, early Asian ventures, Fastweb write-downs)
Criminal entanglements that management claims surprised them despite due diligence
Serial competition law violations requiring decade-long litigation
Chronic disregard for customer data security and transparency
Critical infrastructure failures affecting emergency services
Monopoly pricing that Swiss consumers have no means to escape
Job offshoring despite strong profits and state ownership

Swiss taxpayers, through their government’s 51% stake, remain exposed to further misadventures. The near-silence surrounding the 8-billion-euro Vodafone Italia acquisition—debt-financed, mostly representing intangible assets, announced when nobody was watching—suggests lessons remain unlearned.

The question isn’t whether Swisscom will face another crisis. It’s when—and how many more billions Swiss citizens will lose before meaningful governance reform occurs.

Sources: swissinfo.ch, NZZ, Tages-Anzeiger, 20 Minuten, Handelszeitung, Bilanz, watson.ch, SRF, Basler Zeitung, inside-it.ch, court records and regulatory filings.

Swisscom : Chronique d’une mauvaise gestion, de scandales et de milliards gaspillés

Finance, Technology No Responses »

Nov 172025

Résumé

Swisscom, le fournisseur de télécommunications dominant en Suisse avec 51% de participation étatique, présente un schéma préoccupant d’investissements étrangers catastrophiques, d’implications criminelles, de violations du droit de la concurrence et d’une gouvernance douteuse s’étalant sur trois décennies. Les contribuables suisses, en tant qu’actionnaires majoritaires, ont finalement supporté les coûts des échecs de gestion totalisant bien plus de 10 milliards de francs.

1. La piste désastreuse des investissements étrangers

Debitel : 3,3 milliards de francs jetés par les fenêtres

En 1999, Swisscom a payé 4,3 milliards de francs pour acquérir Debitel, le troisième fournisseur de services mobiles d’Allemagne, avec l’ambition de pénétrer le marché allemand de l’UMTS. Cinq ans plus tard, elle l’a vendu pour environ 1 milliard de francs à Permira, cristallisant une perte de 3,3 milliards de francs.

Le fiasco est devenu politiquement explosif. La Délégation des finances du Parlement a été chargée d’enquêter, et le conseiller national Pierre Kohler a calculé que la Confédération suisse avait perdu environ 2 milliards de francs sur ce seul investissement.

Échecs antérieurs : Hongrie, Inde, Malaisie

Entre 1993 et 1997, Swisscom (alors Telecom PTT) a investi 2 milliards de francs dans des entreprises en Hongrie, en Inde, en Malaisie et au Bade-Wurtemberg (Tesion), ainsi que dans le consortium paneuropéen Unisource. Les investissements se sont révélés déficitaires, et Swisscom s’est retirée en 1999. L’ironie amère : les entreprises en Malaisie et en Inde ont ensuite été vendues par leurs nouveaux propriétaires à des multiples de ce que Swisscom avait reçu.

Fastweb : De l’acquisition à la ‘Ndrangheta

En 2007, Swisscom a acquis le fournisseur italien de haut débit Fastweb pour 6,9 milliards de francs. En décembre 2011, Swisscom a été contrainte d’amortir 1,3 milliard d’euros en raison d’une dépréciation massive, décrite par les critiques comme une autre « fosse à milliards ».

2. Le scandale du blanchiment d’argent de la mafia

L’acquisition de Fastweb a entraîné Swisscom dans ce que les procureurs italiens ont qualifié de « l’une des affaires de fraude les plus colossales de l’histoire italienne ».

Entre 2003 et 2006, Fastweb et la filiale de Telecom Italia, Sparkle, auraient été utilisées pour blanchir environ 2 milliards d’euros d’argent de la mafia ‘Ndrangheta à travers des transactions fictives de services téléphoniques internationaux. Le système a également escroqué le fisc italien de 360 millions d’euros de TVA.

La connaissance préalable de Swisscom

Swisscom a admis qu’elle était au courant des enquêtes en cours pour fraude fiscale lors de l’acquisition de Fastweb en 2007. Cependant, l’entreprise a affirmé avoir été prise au dépourvu par la dimension du blanchiment d’argent. Cette défense manque de crédibilité compte tenu de l’ampleur des opérations.

Procédures pénales

Cinquante-six mandats d’arrêt ont été émis, notamment contre le fondateur de Fastweb, Silvio Scaglia (devenu milliardaire grâce à la vente à Swisscom), d’anciens membres du conseil d’administration, et même un sénateur italien du parti de Berlusconi photographié en train d’embrasser un boss de la ‘Ndrangheta.

Les autorités suisses ont effectué des perquisitions au Tessin et à Genève dans le cadre de la coopération internationale.

Pour empêcher les autorités italiennes de placer Fastweb sous administration judiciaire — décrit par le PDG de Fastweb comme « équivalent à assassiner l’entreprise » — le PDG de Swisscom Carsten Schloter a personnellement pris la direction de Fastweb.

Swisscom a dû provisionner 70 millions d’euros pour les responsabilités potentielles.

3. Violations du droit de la concurrence et amendes massives

L’amende de 186 millions de francs pour l’ADSL

En 2009, la Commission de la concurrence (Comco) a constaté que Swisscom avait abusé de sa position dominante sur le marché de 2001 à 2007 en facturant des prix de gros excessifs pour les services ADSL — créant un « effet de ciseaux coûts-prix » qui rendait impossible pour les concurrents d’opérer de manière rentable. L’amende initiale était de 220 millions de francs.

Après une décennie de batailles juridiques au Tribunal administratif fédéral puis au Tribunal fédéral en décembre 2019, l’amende a été confirmée à 186 millions de francs.

Le Tribunal fédéral a jugé le comportement de Swisscom « au minimum négligent » et une violation claire du droit des cartels. La défense de Swisscom selon laquelle les réseaux câblés fournissaient une pression concurrentielle a été rejetée.

Suite au verdict, Sunrise a poursuivi Swisscom pour 350 millions de francs de dommages-intérêts.

L’abus sur le réseau de la Poste

En 2015, la Comco a infligé une amende de 7,9 millions de francs à Swisscom pour abus de position dominante dans un appel d’offres de 2008 pour connecter les sites de la Poste suisse. Swisscom a remporté le contrat en sous-enchérissant de 30% par rapport aux concurrents, tout en facturant à ces mêmes concurrents des prix de gros qui rendaient impossible toute offre compétitive.

Batailles antitrust en cours

En 2021, trois fournisseurs d’accès internet (Init7, SolNet, Ticinocom) ont déposé des plaintes auprès de la Comco, alléguant que les prix de détail de Swisscom étaient si bas que les concurrents achetant des services de gros Swisscom ne pouvaient pas couvrir leurs coûts — une autre allégation d’« effet de ciseaux ».

Dès 2003, la Comco avait dû intervenir lorsque Swisscom a tenté de monopoliser le marché ADSL par des remises de volume discriminatoires à sa filiale Bluewin.

4. La fuite de données de 800 000 clients

L’incident

À l’automne 2017, des criminels ont exploité les identifiants d’accès d’un partenaire commercial de Swisscom pour voler les données personnelles (noms, adresses, numéros de téléphone, dates de naissance) d’environ 800 000 clients.

Le vol de données s’est en fait produit via une société de marketing en Tunisie — un sous-traitant d’un sous-traitant — à qui le partenaire de Swisscom avait indûment transmis les identifiants de connexion.

La réponse de Swisscom : supprimer et minimiser

Des documents internes classifiés « secret » révèlent que Swisscom avait initialement l’intention de n’informer ni les clients concernés ni le public. Trois mois plus tard, contrainte de divulguer, Swisscom a caractérisé les données volées comme « non particulièrement dignes de protection ».

Cependant, la propre évaluation des risques interne de Swisscom, obtenue ultérieurement par des demandes d’accès à l’information, énumérait onze risques graves, notamment : le commerce de données clients sur le darknet, le hameçonnage SMS ciblé, et « l’exposition de VIP ou de personnes en danger » avec des menaces potentielles « à la vie et à l’intégrité physique ».

Traitement différencié

Alors que les clients ordinaires devaient envoyer un SMS pour vérifier s’ils étaient concernés (et le système donnait des résultats peu fiables), les clients VIP, y compris les politiciens, ont été informés de manière proactive.

Swisscom s’est battue pendant deux ans pour empêcher la publication des documents sur les risques. Le Préposé fédéral à la protection des données a conclu que Swisscom « avait eu de la chance » que les dommages anticipés ne se soient largement pas matérialisés.

5. Pannes de réseau en série

2020 : une année de pannes

Rien qu’en 2020, Swisscom a subi au moins six pannes majeures de réseau affectant des millions de clients. Ce n’étaient pas des incidents mineurs — les numéros d’urgence 112, 117, 118 et 144 ont été mis hors service à plusieurs reprises dans plusieurs cantons.

Lors de la panne de février 2020, les services de police et de secours de Bâle-Campagne, Bâle, Winterthour, Saint-Gall et d’autres régions ont dû diriger les appels d’urgence vers des alternatives mobiles. Même l’application gouvernementale Alertswiss a échoué.

Le schéma était si alarmant que la Commission des transports et des télécommunications du Conseil national a convoqué la direction de Swisscom pour interrogation. L’OFCOM a lancé des enquêtes formelles. La Conférence des directrices et directeurs des départements cantonaux de justice et police a déclaré qu’il était « inquiétant pour la population lorsque les appels d’urgence sont impossibles ».

Les pannes se sont poursuivies en 2021 et 2022, Swisscom offrant diverses explications : composants réseau défectueux, comportement logiciel inattendu, ajustements du système de sécurité.

6. Les télécoms les plus chères de Suisse

Surfacturation systémique

Des études de l’Institut scientifique pour les infrastructures et les services de communication (WIK) ont révélé que les consommateurs suisses paient plus pour le mobile, le fixe et l’internet que dans tout autre pays d’Europe. Les prix du haut débit de Swisscom sont environ un tiers plus élevés que ceux des concurrents — lui-même « un record européen ».

La publication de consommateurs K-Tipp a calculé que « les clients financent les pertes étrangères de Swisscom » — l’entreprise réalise des profits excessifs au niveau national, puis gaspille des milliards à l’étranger.

Alors que les anciens monopoles dans les pays de l’UE ont vu leurs parts de marché diminuer à environ 40%, Swisscom a maintenu environ 60% sur ses marchés — une dominance que WIK attribue à la faveur réglementaire et à un marketing agressif que les concurrents ne peuvent égaler.

Même si Swisscom augmente ses prix (l’abonnement « inOne mobile basic » est passé de 45 à 50 francs en 2020), les concurrents offrent des données illimitées pour 20-30 francs par mois. Les consommateurs suisses paient environ 100 francs par mois pour des services combinés — nettement plus qu’en Allemagne ou en Autriche.

7. L’acquisition de Vodafone Italia : l’histoire se répète ?

Communication furtive

Swisscom a annoncé l’approbation réglementaire pour son acquisition de Vodafone Italia à 8 milliards d’euros le vendredi soir 20 décembre 2024 — alors que le pays était concentré sur le rapport de la CEP sur l’effondrement de Credit Suisse et les négociations bilatérales avec l’UE. La finalisation de la transaction a été annoncée le 2 janvier, alors que la bourse de Zurich était fermée pour un jour férié.

Le conseiller national SVP Franz Grüter l’a qualifié de « presque malicieux » : « Ils ont définitivement choisi la date parce qu’ils savaient que cela passerait complètement inaperçu. »

Dette et dégradation

L’acquisition a été entièrement financée par la dette, augmentant la dette nette de Swisscom de 9,1 milliards de francs à 15,6 milliards de francs — près de 2 000 francs par résident suisse. Moody’s a ensuite dégradé la note de crédit de Swisscom, notant que la dette dépasserait les limites imposées par le gouvernement pendant une période prolongée.

« De l’air italien »

L’analyse du rapport annuel 2024 de Swisscom révèle que plus de 75% du prix d’achat de 7,4 milliards de francs représente du goodwill et des actifs incorporels — « de l’air italien » selon les termes des analystes financiers. Le goodwill seul représente 1,1 milliard de francs ; les licences 2 milliards ; et les « relations avec la marque et les clients » 1,7 milliard.

Silence politique

Remarquablement, cette acquisition n’a rencontré pratiquement aucune opposition politique — contrairement à l’offre bloquée pour Eircom en 2005 pour seulement 4,6 milliards de francs. Les critiques soutiennent que le timing a été conçu pour éviter tout examen, et le représentant de l’État au conseil d’administration de Swisscom a approuvé l’accord sans débat public.

8. Délocalisation des emplois suisses malgré la rentabilité

Le schéma

En septembre 2025, des rapports ont révélé que Swisscom prévoit de délocaliser des centaines d’emplois de développement informatique de la Suisse vers ses centres de Riga (Lettonie) et Rotterdam (Pays-Bas), où les salaires des ingénieurs seniors sont de 65 000-75 000 francs contre jusqu’à 140 000 en Suisse.

Lorsque Swisscom a ouvert ces bureaux étrangers en 2019-2020, la direction a explicitement déclaré qu’ils « ne se feraient pas au détriment des emplois suisses ». Maintenant, l’entreprise invoque « l’optimisation continue des coûts » pour la délocalisation.

Le syndicat Syndicom rapporte que les employés de plus de 50 ans craignent particulièrement pour leurs postes. Malgré de bons résultats financiers, Swisscom continue de supprimer des postes suisses tandis que le personnel à l’étranger a augmenté de près de 50%, passant de 2 689 à 3 982 en cinq ans.

Pratiques commerciales douteuses

En mai 2025, des employés dans des boutiques Swisscom de la région Vaud-Valais-Fribourg ont révélé des pratiques douteuses : enregistrement illégal des conversations avec les clients sans consentement, manipulation des contrats pour atteindre les objectifs de vente, et vente d’abonnements jeunes à des personnes âgées non éligibles.

9. Questions de gouvernance

La mort du PDG

En juillet 2013, le PDG Carsten Schloter a été retrouvé mort à son domicile dans un apparent suicide à l’âge de 49 ans. Dans l’une de ses dernières interviews, il se décrivait comme « une victime de la communication moderne », trouvant « de plus en plus difficile de décompresser ». Le décès est survenu alors que la Comco ouvrait une enquête sur les pratiques ADSL, bien que sa lettre de suicide aurait invoqué des raisons personnelles.

L’hybride étatique

Les critiques décrivent Swisscom comme « un hybride indicible » — formellement organisé selon le droit privé mais à majorité étatique, ce qui signifie que les contribuables suisses supportent les risques commerciaux tandis que la direction opère comme une entreprise privée cherchant à maximiser les profits.

L’intérêt du Conseil fédéral pour une libéralisation accrue du marché semble limité compte tenu de sa participation, créant un conflit entre ses rôles de régulateur et de bénéficiaire des profits de monopole.

Conclusion : schéma d’échec de responsabilité

Le bilan révèle des problèmes systémiques :

Pertes répétées de plusieurs milliards dans les investissements étrangers (Debitel, premières aventures asiatiques, dépréciations de Fastweb)
Implications criminelles que la direction prétend avoir découvertes malgré la diligence raisonnable
Violations en série du droit de la concurrence nécessitant une décennie de litiges
Mépris chronique de la sécurité des données clients et de la transparence
Pannes d’infrastructures critiques affectant les services d’urgence
Tarification monopolistique à laquelle les consommateurs suisses n’ont aucun moyen d’échapper
Délocalisation d’emplois malgré des profits solides et la propriété étatique

Les contribuables suisses, à travers la participation de 51% de leur gouvernement, restent exposés à d’autres mésaventures. Le silence quasi total entourant l’acquisition de Vodafone Italia à 8 milliards d’euros — financée par la dette, représentant principalement des actifs incorporels, annoncée quand personne ne regardait — suggère que les leçons restent non apprises.

La question n’est pas de savoir si Swisscom fera face à une autre crise. C’est quand — et combien de milliards supplémentaires les citoyens suisses perdront avant qu’une réforme significative de la gouvernance ne se produise.

Sources : swissinfo.ch, NZZ, Tages-Anzeiger, 20 Minuten, Handelszeitung, Bilanz, watson.ch, SRF, Basler Zeitung, inside-it.ch, documents judiciaires et dépôts réglementaires.

Negative interest rates are here to stay

Finance No Responses »

Oct 132020

Paul Schmelzing at the Bank of England recently published a working paper “Eight centuries of global real interest rates, R-G, and the ‘suprasecular’ decline, 1311–2018” in which he argues, very persuasively, that both interest rates and their volatility have been steadily declining for the last 700 years.

This graph summarises his hypotheses:

Headline global real rate, GDP-weighted, and trend declines, 1317-2018.

Here are excerpts from his conclusions:

First, my new data showed that long-term real rates – be it in the form of private debt, non-marketable loans, or the global sovereign “safe asset” – should always have been expected to hit “zero bounds” around the time of the late 20th and early 21st century, if put into long-term historical context. In fact, a meaningful – and growing – level of long-term real rates should have been expected to record negative levels. There is little unusual about the current low rate environment which the “secular stagnation” narrative attempts to display as an unusual aberration, linked to equally unusual trend-breaks in savings-investment balances, or productivity measures. To extent that such literature then posits particular policy remedies to address such alleged phenomena, it is found to be fully misleading: the trend fall in real rates has coincided with a steady long run uptick in public fiscal activity; and it has persisted across a variety of monetary regimes: fiat- and non-fiat, with and without the existence of public monetary institutions.

There is no reason, therefore, to expect rates to “plateau”, to suggest that “the global neutral rate may settle at around 1% over the medium to long run”, or to proclaim that “forecasts that the real rate will remain stuck at or below zero appear unwarranted” as some have suggested. With regards to policy, very low real rates can be expected to become a permanent and protracted monetary policy problem – but my evidence still does not support those that see an eventual return to “normalized” levels however defined : the long-term historical data suggests that, whatever the ultimate driver, or combination of drivers, the forces responsible have been indifferent to monetary or political regimes; they have kept exercising their pull on interest rate levels irrespective of the existence of central banks, (de jure) usury laws, or permanently higher public expenditures. They persisted in what amounted to early modern patrician plutocracies, as well as in modern democratic environments, in periods of low-level feudal Condottieri battles, and in those of professional, mechanized mass warfare.

I opine that this makes a lot of sense and leads me to think that a society where interest – and by extension inflation – are more-or-less non-existent, is possible.

We are already almost there; I receive no interest on money I deposit with a bank and last year Jsyke Bank in Denmark was peddling mortgages at minus 0.5%.

Economists (who, statistically, are more often wrong than right) will argue that a certain amount of inflation is necessary, but without providing undisputed evidence. The advantages and pitfalls of inflation are well-known and I personally find the concept of my savings automatically diminishing is abhorrent, but the clincher for me is that inflation is unsustainable.

For the past decade, monetary institutions have been pouring money into the world, following the economic ‘theory’ that this would jump-start economies and bring back the beloved inflation. These central bankers, in their arrogance, haven’t paused to consider the law of unintended consequences; their money-pouring has brought about:

Companies in poor health, which should have fallen by the wayside, are propped-up by virtually costless borrowing.

Banks are chastised for handing out too many mortgages by the very monetary authority which gave them the money to lend in the first place.

Rather than lending to businesses, the banks have used cheap money to bolster their balance sheets.

Inflation hasn’t risen and it never will in a society awash with money.

I sincerely hope that Schmelzing is right, the world will be a much more pleasant and stable place to live.

Designing a portfolio for retirement

Finance No Responses »

Oct 022020

Planning retirement finances is harrowing; finding reliable, disinterested information is difficult. This paper studies and constructs a portfolio based on a set of formal requirements and analyses its potential performance by back-testing on 20 years of history.

This page is available as a PDF Download

Problem statement and Requirements

Given a single down-payment, construct a portfolio that will generate a retirement pension.
A stipend will be withdrawn the beginning of each year. The amount will increase by 1.3% p/a to compensate for the average inflation in Switzerland.
The portfolio’s life shall exceed 30 years.

Objectives

The risk of total loss is minimised.
The portfolio shall be as resilient as possible to market turmoil.

Constraints

Instruments. Given the problem statement, the only viable instrument is shares.
- Bonds cannot produce the required revenue.
- Derivatives are subject to default by the writer.
- Funds have a risk of default by the managing entity and their performance is predicated by fees.
- Real-estate companies (as opposed to funds) that actually possess all their properties are acceptable because they are backed with physical property.
Currency. CHF only; forex risks are unacceptable because every currency has lost value against the Swiss Franc in the last 20 years.
Geography. The shares shall be in Swiss companies domiciled in Switzerland.
Debtor Diversity: No single company shall represent more than 5% of the portfolio.
Industry Diversity: No single industry shall represent more than 5% of the portfolio.

Deliverables

A set of objective criteria for stock picking that fulfils the constraints.
Based on these criteria, a basket of desirable shares in which to invest.
Buying, re-balancing and selling strategies.
An estimate of the stipend percentage range.
An analysis of the basket’s performance, by back-testing on historical data 2000-2019, which will determine:
- The buffer that needs to be kept to maintain yearly payments, so as not to be obliged to sell at an unfavourable moment.
- The portfolio’s probable behaviour in worst-case scenarios (e.g. entering the market just before a stock-market crash).
- Situations in which the portfolio’s life might be compromised and mitigating actions.

Selection Criteria

An ideal company would have a healthy balance sheet, exhibit constant growth and lose no value during a stock-market crash. Such companies do not exist, however amongst the 40-odd financial ratios available, 3 are particularly useful to filter out desirable candidates.

The Sortino ratio, a downside variant of the Sharpe ratio, is a strong predictor of companies that have the desired kind of behaviour.
The Quick Ratio, whilst dependent on the industry, generally demonstrates that a company has had the foresight to keep enough cash on hand to weather difficulties.
Resistance to turmoil, which can be assessed by observing the stock’s behaviour during a stock-market crash. It consists of two associated components:
- Resilience. The percentage value remaining after a crash.
- Recovery. The period of time before the stock re-attains its pre-crash value.

Graphically:

Ideal shares will have a resilience close to 100% and a short recovery.

(This graph is in fact the SPI and there were two major crashes. The latter is used as it is more recent. Thus, the SPI has a resilience of 47% and a recovery of 23 months).

Stock Selection

An initial selection is performed where companies will be scored using a decision matrix with 4 components outlined above:

The Sortino ratio, weight 20%.
The Resilience, weight 30%.
The Recovery, weight 30%.
The Return (growth plus dividend), weight 20%.

Note: The gold standard for expressing portfolio returns is the CAGR (Compound Average Growth Rate) but as it is calculated using solely a start and ending value, it is sensitive to the end-points:

This extreme case has a CAGR of -0.1% (the blue line) but over the entire period its global trend is positive (the green line, a least-squares linear fit).

Shares’ growths will be measured using the slope of the green line, expressed as a percentage of the average value, in this example 12%. The CAGR will also be calculated and used as a cross-check for cases like this.

From this subset a manual review will determine the companies finally chosen (judgement is required for the Quick Ratio, which has different meanings for each industry).

Universe

The initial instrument universe is the SPI and Swiss Real-Estate companies. Of the 215 SPI shares, 205 are quoted in CHF and totally domiciled in Switzerland. Of these, 82 and have been quoted continuously since 2000 and show positive returns.

Duplicate shares (e.g. Lindt N and Lindt PS) are be eliminated by the lowest score.

To meet the diversity constraint, a single stock with the best score of each industry segment is retained.

Selected shares

After applying the criteria and manual selection 21 shares remain:

These will constitute the proposed portfolio. The benchmark is the SPI.

Rejects

The remaining shares were eliminated because:

Railways. Despite their high scores, TITL BN BERG and JUNGFRAUBAHN HLD both have their entire infrastructure in one location. They were dropped in favour of BVZ HOLDING, which is significantly more diversified.
Foods. NESTLE scored lower but was preferred over BELL AG, which is not entirely Swiss and focussed on a single product line, meat. GROUP MINOTERIES has poor returns.
Chocolates. BARRY CALLEBAUT has a slight edge over LINDT and VILLARS.
The remainder due to insufficient resilience and/or recovery.

Weighting

The SPI index components are weighted by companies’ market value, as the aim is to assess the performance of the total CHF amount invested in the market.

On the other hand, an investor’s components are chosen to diversify risk; it is thus undesirable to give more weight to any particular company as this would proportionally increase risk for that component. Consequently, the portfolio will be built with equal CHF amounts of each stock.

Performance Analysis

The baseline comparison consists of comparing the portfolio against the SPI and SMI, normalised to 100 on the 1^st of January 2000:

Despite the impression due to the scale, all three lost ~55% in the 2007-2008 crash.

The portfolio recovers much faster (20 months), than the SPI (50 months) or the SMI (73 months).

Note: The SPI’s CAGR over the last 30 years is 9.89%.

Buffering

Selling shares to obtain cash for stipends is undesirable after a stock market crash, as their value will be down by some 55%. There is thus a requirement for a cash buffer to avoid such sales.

The portfolio recovers from a crash in some 20 months. Assuming that a stock-market crash occurs about once a decade, there will be two or three stock market crashes during the portfolio’s lifetime.

As the first crash can occur at inception, the minimum buffer is 2 year’s stipends. Assuming that the stipend is low enough to allow the portfolio to grow during the first half of its life, it may not be necessary to buffer for subsequent crashes.

Buffering with cash is costly with the current -0.7% negative interest. An attractive alternative is to use Real-Estate, which offers more modest growth but suffers much less in troubled markets. Of the 31 Real-Estate companies quoted on SWX, only 5 meet the criteria:

Their worst-case behaviour is a loss of ~15% and a recovery of 11 months, which is an acceptable level of risk given their average growth of 6.6%. (A 15% loss is covered by growth if the first crash occurs no earlier than 27 months after inception.)

This buffering strategy will be tested in the simulation.

Buying, Re-balancing and Selling strategies

Buying

Of the 116’213 price changes of the members of the portfolio in the past 20 years, the average change was +0.0056 CHF. It follows that given the choice of buying today or waiting until tomorrow in the hope that the price will go down, it is logical to buy today (with an appropriate limit to avoid getting executed ‘high’ in the day).

This can by improved by observing a stock’s historical random walk to determine the chances of buying at a lower price over some period. For a given stock, for each day in the history, determine how often a price fall of at least X% occurred in the N following days (here, N=60):

Thus, if I want to buy Barry Callebaut, there is a 72% chance that it will fall by 2.5% in the next 60 days. Intuitively, sought-after shares (Givaudin, IVF Hartmann and Nestlé) are less likely to fall, so the limited order will need to be closer to the current price. Conversely, more volatile shares (Straumann and Tecan) are more likely to be had at a larger discount.

The buying strategy is thus to place limited orders at a discount of the percentage which meets the chosen chance of success. I implemented this strategy on the 2nd of October 2020. On the 20th of November, I had acquired 19 out of the 20 stocks at an average discount of 2.3% below the October 2nd prices, so this strategy works (except for Kühne & Nagel, which never fell 3% during the period).

Re-Balancing

The average cost of a transaction is about 0.85%, so the re-balancing cost is 1.7% of the position. This churning must be weighed against the hypothetical gain obtained by improved diversification.

It makes more sense to sell smaller fractions of multiple positions rather than entire positions, as the difference in transaction fees is negligible (0.825% for transactions over 50’000 versus 0.9% for those below 50’000).

Selling

The stipend pay-out will be made each year, using the dividends and sales as necessary. The simulations determined that the optimal rules for selling are:

When the market has fallen over the preceding year, prefer to sell real-estate otherwise sell shares (avoid selling shares at a poor price).
Select the 5 shares that have the highest growth in the last 12 months (5 was determined empirically).
Choose the two largest CHF positions.
Sell half the necessary amount of each of the two positions (to minimise unbalancing).

If a sale would represent more than 90% of the position, sell the entire position (to avoid subsequent odd-lot trades.

Simulation

A simulator was built to perform the back-testing. It operates as follows:

The simulation is initiated by:

Setting the clock to the start date.
Depositing CHF 1’000’000 in the account.
Immediately paying the stipend, proportional to the time remaining in the current year.
Use the remaining cash to populate the portfolio with shares and real-estate.

Then, repeatedly:

Advance the clock to 31^st of December.
Calculate the dividends from the current positions and remove 35% withholding tax (which is written off). Credit the portfolio cash with the remaining 65%.
Pay-out custodian fees of 0.35% of the portfolio’s current market value.
Advance to 1^st of January.
Increase the stipend by the rate of inflation.
Sell a sufficient amount of positions to make the cash greater than the current stipend.
Pay-out the stipend (or declare failure if there is insufficient cash).

Finally, calculate the P&L and various statistics.

Transaction fees are applied at the rates for UBS Online Banking. The rate varies by transaction size, about 0.85%. Other brokers / custodians charge significantly less.

SWX fees and Stamp Duty are also deducted.

Results

A typical simulation produces the following:

Discussion

This is a worst-case, the 2000 stock-market crash commenced on the 25^th of September 2000. The other worst case, starting on the 15^th of October 2007, produces almost identical results.

The stipend is 7.2%, CHF 72’000 on the first year, increasing to 92’026 after 20 years.

There are practically no sales at a loss.

The portfolio’s costs are 95’606 ÷ 20 years = 4’780 per year = ~0.5%. This could be significantly reduced by using a less expensive broker / custodian, e.g. SwissQuote.

The total stipends amount to 1’632’512 for an initial investment of 1’000’000.

The portfolio’s final value is just over double the initial deposit.

The portfolio has a CAGR of 3.8%, despite the stipend withdrawals.

The asset allocation remains moderately well balanced at the end of the simulation, the 21 initial companies all remain.

Determining the ideal buffer

Simulations were performed for varying buffer sizes from 0 to 6 years. Whilst increasing the buffer has a positive effect on the portfolio’s lowest value, the final portfolio value and the CAGR are affected negatively. It transpires that a buffer of ~30 months is optimal:

Maximum stipend

The portfolio fails (again, starting on worst-case 25/9/2000) at a stipend of 9.1%:

Ideal stipend

The chosen stipend is a function of the investor’s appetite for risk. With a stipend of 7.2% (the typical simulation above), the portfolio final value was 2’056’468 with a CAGR of 3.8%.

Decreasing the stipend to a more conservative 6% increases the final value to well over 3’000’000 with a CAGR of 6.2%:

Observe the transactions after the 2000 stock-market crash, where real-estate buffer is sold rather than stocks, until 2003 with the Givaudan sale.

Unfavourable situations

It is well-known that past performance is not a predictor for the future and a simultaneous stock-market and real-estate crash remains possible. Unforeseeable black-swan events will certainly happen in the incoming 30 years.

That said, most of the selected companies are manufacturers that have an established niche, producing tangible goods. All have a healthy balance sheet and have been well-managed for decades; the risk of total loss is thus extremely small.

Conclusion

The designed portfolio, implemented with a buffer of 30 months and a stipend of 6% meets the requirements with minimal risk.

Post-Scriptum

The same portfolio, run with neither stipends nor buffering and re-investing the dividends, starting on the pre-crash worst-case in September 2000, has the following behaviour (a CAGR of 12.5%):

Libor and Saron for dummies

Finance No Responses »

Jun 022020

Back in 2011 the banks, many of them in the UK, were caught cheating by incorrect fixing the LIBOR rates between themselves. The British Financial Supervisory Authority was obliged to stop this and decided that the LIBOR would be abolished at the end of 2021 (it would apparently have been too much of a hardship to ask banks to stop fleecing the market immediately).

The Swiss National Bank had to invent an alternative to the LIBOR, which they did by creating the Saron (Swiss Average Rate Overnight), which isn’t based on rates that banks submit, but the true rate observed every day on the open market. These rates are publicly visible, so cheating is impossible (at least until banks find a novel way to cheat).

Said rates have been known since time immemorial and SIX (the Swiss Stock Exchange) provide a spreadsheet to calculate the Saron rate for any period since 1999. The Saron rates look like this:

Since mid-2015 the interest rate on the Swiss Franc has hovered around -0.7%. Notice that this a is a negative rate, which means that if “A” lends money to “B”, then “A” must pay “B” 0.7% for the privilege of lending him the money. Replace “A” with your bank’s name and “B” with your own name and re-read that sentence carefully.

Traditionally, banks have set LIBOR mortgage rates at about 1% over the interbank rate; their margin for the loan, fair enough. For the 1st of January to the 31st of March 2020, the Saron rate was minus 0.7058%. Adding the 1% margin, the mortgage rate should have been -0.7058% + 1% = 0.2942%.

During that period I paid 0.8% for my 3-month LIBOR mortgage. I have thus been over-charged 172% (0.8 is 172% of 0.2942).

(There is a minor, deliberate error in this. Can you spot it?)

A Wunch of Bankers

Finance No Responses »

Jan 162015

Yesterday evening I was fortunate to be amongst a select few who had the privilege to be invited to hear the investment advice of the chief strategist of a major Swiss bank. (I should mention at the outset that the vast majority of the audience’s reference currency is the Swiss franc.)

The speaker was clearly an erudite man and his delivery was flawless. The underlying theme of his speech was divergence in today’s economy: in interest rates, in GDP, in unemployment, in central banks’ strategies, and so forth. Render unto Caesar, his presentation was concise, well-researched and extremely persuasive.

The conclusion of his argument was the bank’s investment strategy. In a nutshell, Swiss and European equities present few opportunites. On the other hand, the USA appears to have left recession and is showing strong growth perspectives, which he estimated at around 6%. The bank’s strategy is thus to move their clients’ assets to Swiss and European gilt of the highest quality for portfolio protection and to US blue-chips for revenue.

When questioned on the Swiss National Bank’s strategy of locking the Swiss franc to a floor of 1.20 CHF/EUR, he was of the opinion that the floor to the Euro would be replaced by a floor against a basket of currencies, probably EUR/USD/JPY, sometime in 2015.

Were I to have followed his advice, this morning, first thing, I would have moved my investments into US blue-chips, the stocks that participate in the Dow-Jones Index: American Express, Boeing, Caterpillar, etc. in the hope of a return of some 6% instead of the measly percent or two that I get on Swiss franc holdings.

With the most tragic timing for our strategist, some 14 hours later the Swiss National Bank announced that it had abandoned the 1.20 floor. The effect was instantaneous: the EUR and the USD crashed against the CHF, settling at day-end to ~0.86CHF/USD and CHF/EUR at a similar rate.

Had I bought those American shares some hours previously, I would have taken a 15% hit on my portfolio in so-many hours; even if the strategist’s predictions come true, I’ll have to wait two and a half years before breaking even.

There are several lessons to be learned from this story:

Despite everything that your banker, hand-on-heart, assures you, he has no interest whatsoever in your financial well-being. His sole aim in life is to persuade you to trade your holdings as often as possible so that he can gather a maximum commission. If, despite the commissions, you make money, he’ll congratulate himself on having helped you. If you lose money, he’ll appear heart-broken at your misfortune, which was entirely due to the unfavourable market.
If your reference currency is the CHF and you invest in higher-yield USD-labelled assets, you’re exposed to the CHF/USD exchange risk. Momentarily you might get away with it; as this example shows, you are likely to take a caning.
Inversely, if your reference currency is the EUR and you buy CHF assets, your yield will be much more frugal… but your capital will be better preserved.

The take-away from all this is that in today’s liquid markets there is no free lunch. If your ambition is to receive the rate of inflation plus a whisker on your investments, there’s a strong likelihood that you’ll get it. If your ambition is get 6%, be prepared to lose 15% momentarily when things go tits-up.

P.S. For those whose mother-tongue is not English, the title is a pun

UBS comes to its senses (finally)

Finance No Responses »

Dec 102013

18 months ago I suggested that UBS get out of investment banking, if for no other reason than I was sickened by having to pay thousands of francs to bail a too-big-to-fail greedy bunch of arseholes who should have been hung out to dry long ago. I apologise for the strong language, but I really am sick and tired of this. In an unexpected move, they appointed Sergio Ermotti, a wise Swiss-Italian (like the brilliant Alfredo Gysi) as group CEO and he had the sense wind down the loss-making division. I’m far from ready to heap praise on UBS, but let us render unto Caesar, it’s a step in the right direction.

Cyprus bailout tax

Finance, Politics No Responses »

Mar 172013

The European Union has decided to bail out the Cypriots on the condition of imposing a 9.9% one-off tax on holdings over €100’000 deposits in Cypriot banks and 6.7% below €100’000. The justification is that Cyprus only represents 0.2% of the EU GDP and the holdings in question are held mostly by rich Russians and a handful of under-represented Brits. Be that true or not makes no difference; citizen X living in Cyprus has exactly the same rights as citizen X living in France, Germany or wherever. Unilaterally confiscating a citizen’s assets without due cause is not only unacceptable, it is theft. Were my government to propose such a measure, my instinctive reaction would be to buy a weapon; for if my basic property rights are no longer secure, there’s little left else to lose.

Thomas Minder initiative in English

Finance, Law, Politics No Responses »

Mar 012013

The European Union seems close to making a law that limits excessive bonuses. Few will disagree that the finance industry needs to be curbed, and the intention is good. The problem is in the method proposed; no matter how carefully it will be worded (the text apparently runs to over 1’000 pages), they’ll always be someone smarter to find a work-around.

The wiser and far more concise solution problem was proposed by the Swiss entrepreneur Thomas Minder in the initiative he made back in 2008. Here is an English translation, which I made from the official German and French texts:

Federal Peoples’ Initiative “against Rip-off”^[1]
The Swiss Federal constitution of 18 April 1994 is completed as follows:

Article 95, alinea 3 (new)

In order to protect the economy, private property and shareholders and to ensure sustainable management of businesses, the law requires that Swiss public companies listed on stock exchanges in Switzerland or abroad observe the following rules:

Each year, the Annual General Meeting votes the total remuneration (both monetary and in kind) of the Board, the Executive Board and the Advisory Board. Each year, the AGM elects the President of the Board or the Chairman of the Board and, one by one, the members of the board, the members of the Compensation Committee and the independent proxy voter or the independent representative. Pension funds vote in the interests of their policyholders and disclose how they voted. Shareholders may vote electronically at a distance; proxy voting by a member of the company or by a depositary is prohibited.
Board members receive no compensation on departure, or any other compensation, or any compensation in advance, any premium for acquisitions or sales of companies and cannot act as consultants or work for another company in the group. The management of the company cannot not be delegated to a legal entity.
The company statutes stipulate the amount of annuities, loans and credits to board members, bonus and participation plans and the number of external mandates, as well as the duration of the employment contract of members of the management.
Violation of the provisions set out in letters a to c above shall be sanctioned by imprisonment for up to three years and a fine of up to six years’ remuneration.

Article 197 chapter 8 (new)

Pending implementation of the law, the Federal Council shall implement legal provisions within one year following the acceptance of article 95 alinea 3.

The genius of Minder’s text is that instead of setting limits on bonuses, it simply forces shareholders to approve them every year, whilst ensuring that it’s the real shareholders that vote.

We’ll be voting on it this weekend (I already voted for) and it seems that it has a good chance of passing. If it does,

Minder’s text was passed on the 3rd of March 2013 by all the counties and an astonishing 67.9% of the voters. Of the 183 initiatives submitted to the vote in Switzerland since 1893, only 21 (8.7%) have been accepted. 67.9% is the 3rd highest score ever obtained by a popular initiative. The highest score, 83.8%, was obtained in the 1993 initiative to make the 1st of August a National holiday; hardly ground-breaking. The 2nd highest score, 71.4%, was for the 1921 initiative on international treaties.

I predict that the concept will gradually be adopted globally and Thomas Minder will be recognised as the father of a new era in corporate governance.

1. It is difficult to find an exact translation of Abzocker. Cheater, swindler, deceiver and liar are all close. Abzockerei literally means rip-off, but Abzockerei isn’t slang. Scam is another synonym.

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